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Abstract: Kant’s treatment of war is usually discussed as part of his political 
philosophy or philosophy of history. In contrast, this essay locates these 
discussions in direct reference to major elements of his moral philosophy: 
autonomy, the categorical imperative, and the moral relationality of the 
kingdom of ends. Within this context, Kant’s account of war, particularly in 
writings from the 1790s, can be read as affirming war as morally 
unintelligible: It is the expression of a collective withdrawal from the 
constitutive relationality of moral community. This results in a radical 
disparity in the exercise of moral autonomy by the sovereign agency of the 
state with respect to peace, on one hand, and with respect to war, on the 
other. 
I. War: Radical Challenge to Human Relationality 
Kant’s discussions of war are most often located in texts that 
articulate the framework of his political philosophy1 or sketch elements 
of his philosophy of history.2 In consequence, most accounts of his 
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thinking about war tend to bypass questions about the location of war 
within the basic conceptual taxonomy of his moral philosophy. These 
accounts often concentrate instead on questions or topics that place 
war as a subject falling within the specific purview of political 
philosophy or the philosophy of history. They thus engage questions 
such as the extent to which Kant’s discussions align him with the 
traditions of just war thinking,3 constitute an element in his theory of 
political sovereignty,4 provide a basis for later accounts of an 
international cosmopolitan order,5 or enable him to negotiate the 
pitfalls of a Hegelian dialectic that would make war morally 
instrumental to the achievement of the ultimate ends of human 
history.6 
Pursuing these questions continues to yield useful results; for 
instance, recent work along these lines has drawn attention to Kant’s 
initial adumbration of some elements anticipating the articulation of a 
set of post bellum conditions that are now often incorporated into just 
war theories and to the application of Kant’s discussion to international 
interventions in the case of a ‘failed state’.7 My goal in this essay, 
however, is not directly to engage these questions or other ones 
arising primarily from the contexts of political philosophy and the 
philosophy of history, as instructive as those tasks may be. This 
essay’s more fundamental concern arises from the fact that questions 
such as these (perhaps with the exception of ones similar to that 
posed in terms of Hegel’s historical dialectic) seem to presume that 
‘war’ functions conceptually in ways that can be unproblematically 
located with respect to the key concepts structuring Kant’s moral 
philosophy. It is thus taken for granted that there is little need to 
provide a detailed moral account or analysis of war itself in terms of 
the fundamental conceptual structure of his moral philosophy. On this 
presumption, war is taken to be a course of action (or an array of 
various courses of action) that, at least in certain circumstances, could 
rightly be incorporated into the maxims of autonomous decisions made 
by moral agents in accord with the dictates of moral reason.8 
Over against such a presumption I will be arguing in this essay 
that Kant’s writings, particularly those from the 1790s, provide 
substantial indications that war had started to take on a deeply 
problematic status in relation to the central concepts of his moral 
philosophy. War is no longer just one particularly complex moral issue 
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arising from conflicting claims to right that arise between states in the 
international arena and within which various courses of actions need to 
be weighed with respect to the demands of moral reason. It starts to 
become as well a key marker of the deep tensions inextricably 
embedded in the moral circumstances of humanity’s efforts to 
extirpate its self-incurred propensity to evil, i.e., the propensity to 
invert the fundamental maxim for determining one’s action: one 
subordinates the maxim that articulates the universally applicable 
demands of moral reason to a maxim that serves self-preference and 
self-exception in the face of reason’s universal demand. This 
problematic status arises to the extent that Kant’s discussions of war 
in these later writings indicate that he has begun to consider it as a 
social counterpart to the radical evil that, in Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, he had articulated as lying deep within the 
structure of autonomous moral agency.9 War no longer presents itself 
simply as a possible object that can be determined to be fit (or unfit) 
for autonomous moral choice; it looms now, instead, as a thoroughly 
destructive social expression of the dynamics of the fundamental 
moral disorder of self-preference and self-exception that Kant calls 
‘radical evil’. The radical evil of war is that it completely undermines 
the human relationality and solidarity that, as the locus of elements 
formative of a universal moral community, provides the constitutive 
context for any and all agents’ exercise of a genuine autonomy of 
mutually acknowledged freedom. 
On the account I am proposing, the fundamental conceptual 
markers delimiting Kant’s account of the moral use of reason—the 
autonomy of human moral agency, the categorical imperative as a 
demand of the practical use of reason, and the mutual respect that 
constitutes the universal moral community of autonomous agents that 
he terms ‘the kingdom of ends’—are what provide the basis that 
eventually moves his thinking along a trajectory that requires war to 
be taken as a form of the moral unintelligibility that lies at the core of 
radical evil in both its personal and its social forms. Just as a maxim of 
self-preference marks out an individual agent’s withdrawal from the 
mutuality of the moral community that provides intelligibility to the 
universality of reason’s demand, war marks out a more far-reaching 
withdrawal from the constitutive relationality of moral community; it is 
a withdrawal that is collective in its scope. In the case of war, its 
unintelligibility lies in the depth and extent to which it destabilizes the 
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human solidarity and relationality formative of moral community; in 
consequence, it stands as a constant threat to undermine both the 
possibility and the efficacy of the exercise of autonomous human 
agency. The destabilization it effects is such that Kant regards war as 
a condition of unqualified lawlessness: it is the violently enacted denial 
of the human relationality requisite for the exercise of autonomous 
human agency. It is the social expression of a self-preferential maxim 
that, in the guise of protecting the rights and well-being of one’s own 
civil society, allows, enjoins, and gives social approbation to the 
inflicting of deadly violence upon those fellow autonomous agents who, 
in a primal denial of human solidarity and relationality, are now 
deemed to be ‘enemies’. 
Two related texts that are particularly important for an initial 
charting of this trajectory in Kant’s thinking can be found in “Perpetual 
Peace” and in the “Conclusion” to Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals. 
These texts are the ones in which Kant most directly and emphatically 
claims the status of a categorical imperative for the maxim ‘there shall 
be no war’: [Y]et reason, from the throne of the highest morally 
legislative power, delivers an absolute condemnation of war as a 
procedure for determining rights and, on the contrary, makes a 
condition of peace, which cannot be instituted or assured without a 
pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty. (ZeF GS 8:356/ET 
327)Now morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: 
there is to be no war, neither war between you and me in a state nor 
war between us as states, which, although they are internally in a 
lawful condition, are still externally (in relation to one another) in a 
lawless condition; for war is not the way in which everyone should 
seek his rights. (MS GS 6: 354/ET 491)  
In these texts, the categorical imperative stands out, both 
substantively and rhetorically, as the central point of moral reference, 
but the two other central Kantian moral concepts, autonomy and 
mutual respect, each play a major role in the bold moral claim that I 
take him to be advancing here. With regard to the first, inasmuch as 
moral reason ‘issues from its throne’ an absolute condemnation of war 
incumbent upon all as a direct duty, this prohibition stands as a 
categorical imperative for all autonomous agents and its enactment 
thus requires the exercise of autonomous human agency. With regard 
to the second, the “irresistible veto” against war that morally practical 
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reason here pronounces as a categorical imperative bears upon the 
relation of respect “between you and me” that is required of all of us 
who stand in relation to one another in the “lawful condition” of right 
that constitutes the civil community of the state. This categorical 
imperative against war does not simply arise in virtue of the respect 
we owe one another as members of a kingdom of ends; its full focus in 
this instance is upon the affirmation and sustaining of that respect as 
the very condition for autonomous moral life. It is not merely a 
transgression of law; it is a dismantling of the very framework that 
makes law possible. 
II. Lawlessness and the Moral Unintelligibility of 
War 
What I have proposed so far is that, in his latest writings, Kant 
characterizes war in ways that suggest that it poses a singular moral 
challenge that is far more fundamental than whether there are reasons 
and circumstances that morally justify declaring and prosecuting a 
specific war. War stands, instead, as a radical challenge to the exercise 
of human autonomy inasmuch as it represents a fundamental 
undermining of the human relationality that provides autonomy with 
its constitutive context. At the same time, as Kant tries to articulate 
the nature of this challenge he returns to parts of the conceptual 
territory—in particular, the concept of ‘the state of nature’ as 
‘lawless’—that he had covered in earlier accounts of the origin of civil 
society that form a core element in his political philosophy. In 
returning to this territory, however, I do not see Kant significantly 
revising that core element with respect to the role it plays in his 
political philosophy, least of all with respect to its function in placing 
him within the broad tradition of social-contract thinking. Rather than 
revising his thinking about the contractual dynamics that structure civil 
society, his reconsideration of the moral status of war focuses, instead, 
on probing more thoroughly the circumstances and dynamics of the 
putative ‘lawlessness’ of such a state of nature with respect to its 
fundamental moral conceptuality and intelligibility. 
In consequence, an important feature in the trajectory of Kant’s 
thought toward affirming the moral unintelligibility of war is his claim 
that this categorical imperative prohibiting war has unconditional 
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authority for all autonomous agents in even the lawless condition that 
constitutes a state of nature. While it remains the case that, as 
members of a particular civil society, autonomous agents are no longer 
in such a lawless condition with respect to their fellow citizens in that 
society, a state of nature continues to constitute the status of 
international relations as lawless prior to the establishment of a 
cosmopolitan world order that will make enduring peace possible. In 
other words, the categorical prohibition against war extends even into 
what Kant considers to be the remaining (and internationally 
pervasive) field of the lawless circumstances of the state of nature out 
of which reason had required the founding of human civil 
communities; this extension is required inasmuch as humans 
intentionally put themselves back into those lawless circumstances 
when, as nations, they contend against one another with deadly force 
in an explicitly undertaken state of war. Kant is thus claiming that this 
unconditioned law prohibiting war, which reason demands that we all 
follow, can and must be discerned by autonomous agents, even when 
they place themselves, as they needs must in declaring war and 
pursuing war, to be once again in an utterly lawless condition. In this 
case, however, the lawless condition marks the absence, not of a civil 
order internal to particular nations and their citizens, but of an 
international civil society constituted by an order of mutual recognition 
and respect among nations. In consequence, this categorical 
prohibition of war touches—though now on the macro scale of the 
human sociality formed by nation-to-nation relations—upon the very 
core of the human mutual relationality whose recognition provides 
fundamental form to the moral order constituted by and through 
autonomous human agency. 
Kant, it should be noted, is quite aware of both the parallels and 
the differences that are involved between constituting the internal civil 
order for particular nations and constituting an international civil order 
among nations. A crucial difference between the two circumstances 
that Kant identifies as the state of nature is that in the case of exiting 
that condition for the sake of constituting the civic order for the 
governance of particular nations, the use of coercion to bring 
individual agents into becoming participants in that order is a 
necessary and justified limitation upon the exercise of their freedom; 
in the case of the international order, however, applying such coercion 
upon a sovereign nation cannot be similarly justified.10 What Kant calls 
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in “Perpetual Peace” a “federalism of free states” (ZeF GS 8: 354/ET 
325) comes about only in virtue of each state entering freely into such 
an association and thereby also freely assenting to the adjudicatory 
mechanisms that such a federation establishes to settle disputes that, 
in the international state of nature, would lead to war. Put in more 
direct terms, in entering into such a federation, a state freely 
renounces the only ‘right’ it seemed to have in the state of nature, i.e., 
the ‘right to war’ (MS GS 6: 343–46/ET 482–84).11 
There is an unmistakable irony, however, in Kant’s account, and 
this irony has a direct bearing upon the substance of the claim that I 
have been making that in these later writings Kant begins to consider 
war morally unintelligible. The irony lies in the fact that the right that a 
nation ‘renounces’ in entering a federation of free states is not a right 
at all, since, on Kant’s account, there is no basis for any right in a 
state of nature—unless one is willing to countenance, in the manner of 
Thrasymachus, the advantage of the stronger as the basis for right. 
The renunciation in question thus is not primarily an act of foregoing a 
basis for action upon which one once legitimately had a claim. It is 
rather the recognition that such a right is illusory: no state has ever 
had a legitimate basis for such a claim to begin with. In the lawless 
condition of the international state of nature, no legitimacy can be 
conferred on any claim to have or to exercise a ‘right’. This illusory 
character of the right to war can thus be taken as the initial and 
perhaps the most fundamental marker of the moral unintelligibility of 
war. 
The irony of renouncing a right that is not at all a right is further 
compounded, moreover, by the problem of identifying the agent (or 
agents) upon whom moral reason places the demand for such a 
renunciation/recognition and, concomitant with it, the agent (or 
agents) whose autonomy enables them to bring a sovereign state into 
a federation of free states. Put within the larger context of Kant’s 
proposal for a cosmopolitan world order that provides the conditions 
for lasting peace among nations, this question of the agency 
responsible for the constitution of a cosmopolitan world order brings to 
light an unresolved tension between his account of moral autonomy 
and his account of political order; this tension bears upon the extent to 
which the moral unintelligibility of war, in undermining the relationality 
that gives form both to the moral and the political order, thereby also 
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undermines the possibility for the exercise of autonomous moral 
agency in the political order. 
On my reading of the relevant texts, there are at least three 
points at which this tension is manifest. The first bears upon the 
identification of circumstances under which this categorical imperative 
prohibiting war becomes an operative demand upon human moral 
agents; the second bears upon the identification of the specific agents 
upon whom it is incumbent to act upon this demand; the third point, 
finally, bears upon the specification of the concrete actions required to 
enact this demand of our moral reason. With respect to each point, 
attention to Kant’s account of the thoroughly lawless social 
circumstance of the international order of sovereign states within 
which human beings, through the agency of those sovereign states, go 
to war with one another is crucial: It provides the context from which 
Kant places singular responsibility upon the autonomous human 
agency of the sovereign, as a ‘moral politician’, for recognizing and 
enacting the categorical demand of the moral reason that “there shall 
be no war.” 
The central feature of that circumstance is that, prior to any 
actual declaration of war or any actual hostilities, it is already a state 
of war: The elements of the rights of nations are these: 1) states, 
considered in their external relation to one another are (like lawless 
savages) by nature in a nonrightful condition. This nonrightful 
condition is a condition of war (of the right of the stronger) even if it is 
not a condition of actual war and actual attacks being constantly made 
(hostilities). (MS GS 6: 344/ET 482)  
Kant argues that within such a “nonrightful condition” the sole 
right that states have is a ‘right to war’, which functions in a tripartite 
manner: with respect to initiating war, conducting war, and ending a 
war (MS GS 6: 344–50/ET 482–87). As already noted, moreover, 
there is a curious character to his discussion of these functions, 
however, in that the right in question is fundamentally problematic: It 
lacks the fundamental social condition necessary for being exercised as 
a right, i.e., the lawful condition of the mutual recognition that, even 
as it became constitutive of civil society for individuals leaving the 
state of nature, was not extended to the relationship between and 
among states. One remark Kant makes in Metaphysics of Morals 
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suggests this lack of mutual recognition lies at the basis of the moral 
unintelligibility of war: “it is pleonastic, however, to speak of an unjust 
enemy in a state of nature; for a state of nature is itself a condition of 
injustice. A just enemy would be one that I would be doing wrong by 
resisting; but then he would also not be my enemy” (MS GS 6: 349–
50/ET 487). 
“Perpetual Peace,” by contrast, does not show similar rhetorical 
constraint in affirming the unintelligibility of war. In that text Kant 
makes the striking remark that “The concept of the right of nations as 
that of the right to go to war is, strictly speaking unintelligible [läβt 
sich eigentlich gar nicht denken] (since it is supposed to be a right to 
determine what is right not by universally valid external laws limiting 
the freedom of each but by unilateral maxims by force)” (ZeF GS 8: 
356–57/ET 328). He then reinforces the claim of unintelligibility by 
evoking the image with which he opened the essay—the Dutch 
innkeeper’s sign that depicts a graveyard as the locus of ‘perpetual 
peace’—as the referent for how one might ironically render intelligible 
such a right to go to war: “one would have to mean by it that it is 
quite right if human beings so disposed destroy one another and thus 
find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of 
violence along with their authors” (ZeF GS 8: 357/ET 328). 
The most important textual locus for articulating the tensions 
facing the exercise of autonomous moral agency in the face of the 
moral unintelligibility of war, however, can be found in Kant’s 
treatment, in the first part of the Appendix to “Perpetual Peace,” of the 
contrast between the ‘moral politician’ and the ‘political moralist’ in the 
manner in which they make decisions and wield power in directing 
affairs of state (ZeF GS 8: 370–80/ET 338–47). The ‘moral politician’ is 
Kant’s designation for the political leader for whom “the concept of 
right is the limiting condition for politics,” in contrast to the ‘political 
moralist’ who “frames a morals to suit the statesman’s advantage” 
(ZeF GS 8: 372/ET 340). At stake in this distinction is the role of the 
exercise of moral autonomy, in the robust sense of properly heeding 
the demands of practical reason, in relation to the exercise of political 
authority and power in the radically lawless context that constitutes 
the international state of nature. Kant’s discussion of the difference 
between these two forms of leadership and the relationship this 
difference has to the major coordinates of his account of the moral use 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Monist, Vol 99, No. 1 (January 2016): pg. 1-12. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does not grant permission for 
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Oxford University 
Press. 
10 
 
of reason will provide the basis for the final section of this essay, which 
will seek to articulate the radical character of the challenge that the 
moral unintelligibility of war presents to the autonomy of moral agents 
who are charged to exercise power and authority in the state. 
III. Peace, War, and the Autonomy of Sovereign 
Agency 
Although Kant does not identify the precise offices in the 
governance and administration of the state that he envisions the moral 
politician holding, the overall thrust of the arguments in “Perpetual 
Peace” that provide the context for this discussion lends plausibility to 
taking his discussion of political leadership to be directed to none other 
than the sovereign rulers of the nations of Europe. “Perpetual Peace” 
can thus be read as a primer for sovereigns providing them with basic 
instruction on how to be moral politicians. The likelihood that he has 
these rulers in mind as a principal audience for his essays rests, in the 
first instance, upon his expressed view that the republican principle of 
governance he favors, i.e., separation of legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers, in which those who legislate act as representative of 
an enfranchised adult male citizenry, functions most properly and 
justly under a monarch who wields the sovereign executive power. It 
is further supported, moreover, by particular indications in his 
argument that the policies most central to instituting an international 
regime for enduring peace, which encompass both the ‘Preliminary’ 
and the ‘Definitive’ articles for perpetual peace, can be effected only 
through a freely exercised agency, i.e., the agency of one individual 
who holds sovereign power. 
Kant’s placing of the locus of executive power in the hands of a 
single monarchical agent is, of course, fraught with implications for his 
political philosophy, particularly with respect to its relation to the 
political agency of the citizenry of the state. That, nonetheless, is not 
the primary issue for this discussion. With respect to the question of 
the moral unintelligibility of war, the most important aspect of Kant’s 
account on which to focus is the character of the moral autonomy that 
is exercised by the sovereign as agent of the state both for war and for 
peace. By locating the agency of the state in a single agent, the 
sovereign, who is capable of acting autonomously in response to the 
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demand of practical reason, Kant’s account satisfies a central condition 
of possibility that he has laid down for the emergence of an order of 
enduring peace: that a state has the capacity for freely leaving the 
international state of nature in order to enter a federation of free 
states and thus to enact autonomously the demand of the categorical 
imperative that there shall be no war. On Kant’s account then, the 
state has this capacity for acting with moral freedom (autonomy)—at 
least with respect to establishing conditions for peace—precisely in 
virtue of the autonomously exercised agency of its sovereign: In this 
case the demand of moral reason that there shall be no war calls upon 
the moral freedom (autonomy) of the sovereign to be exercised as the 
moral freedom (autonomy) of the state. 
It may be the case that in terms of the principles of sovereign 
authority within Kant’s political philosophy, this exercise of a 
sovereign’s moral autonomous agency in matters of state policy may 
be unproblematically characterized as also the exercise of the state’s 
freedom. At the same time this attribution of both moral agency and a 
concomitant freedom of moral autonomy to the state may not be 
unproblematic in terms of the more fundamental conceptual 
coordinates of Kant’s moral philosophy. As I indicate below in a 
concluding consideration on behalf of the claim that Kant’s discussions 
of war move along a trajectory that points towards its moral 
unintelligibility, there is a radical disparity in the exercise of moral 
autonomy with respect to peace, on the one hand, and with respect to 
war, on the other. 
The disparity is simple and fundamental: The freedom with 
which the sovereign and, concomitant with that, the state exercises its 
agency with respect to its establishing conditions for peace is a full 
exercise of moral autonomy. It is an unqualified response by that 
agency to the duty proposed by the categorical imperative that there 
shall be no war. Such a response, moreover, provides an instance in 
which an autonomous agent’s adoption of the maxim, ‘there shall be 
no war’, as a universal law of nature, precisely in the persona of the 
sovereign agency of the state, can be understood as paradigmatically 
a “lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible” (GMS GS 
4: 434/ET 84). In this case, the kingdom of ends is given a concrete, 
though nonetheless partial, instantiation as fulfilling a necessary 
condition for the establishment of a federation of free states that has 
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exited the lawless condition of the international state of nature. In 
contrast, as will be noted at the conclusion of this section, the exercise 
of agency by which a state goes to and conducts war stands as a polar 
opposite to such a full exercise of moral autonomy; exercising agency 
to go to war stands as an explicit denial of the moral reciprocity, i.e., 
the universal and mutual respect for one another’s freedom in which 
members of a kingdom of ends stand to one another, that provides the 
necessary context for the exercise of any agent’s autonomy. 
Kant is quite clear that enduring peace comes about not by 
understanding it as a technical problem that can be resolved on the 
basis of a political expediency that seeks empirical harmonization of 
competing interests; it comes about instead by engaging it as a moral 
problem in which the duty that there shall be no war is recognized as a 
categorical imperative: … the principle [i.e., so act that you can will 
that your maxim should become a universal law (whatever the end 
may be)] of the moral politician, for whom it [perpetual peace] is a 
moral problem (problema morale) is far removed from the other 
[technical principle of the political moralist] in its procedure for leading 
to perpetual peace, which is now wished for not only as a natural good 
but also as a condition arising from acknowledgment of duty. (ZeF GS 
8: 377/ET 344)  
As is the case with the exercise of an individual agent’s 
autonomy in heeding the demands of moral reason, the full 
instantiation of a kingdom of ends is not accomplished by any single 
agent’s exercise of autonomy, but requires the exercise of such 
autonomy by all agents.12 Kant engages this issue in a number of his 
writings, most notably in Book Three of Religion Within the Boundaries 
of Mere Reason. In that text, he articulates its resolution in terms of a 
practical (moral) hope that has its focus on the establishment of an 
‘ethical commonwealth’ that functions in many respects as a universal 
moral counterpart to the cosmopolitan world order that makes 
enduring peace among nations possible and for which a federation of 
free states is a necessary condition. One striking similarity between 
the establishment of such an ethical commonwealth and the 
establishment of a federation of free states is that entrance into each—
in contrast to entrance into a civil society—cannot be coerced; it can 
only come about through the exercise of an agent’s moral freedom. A 
second similarity is that in both instances Kant merely gestures 
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towards engaging the question of what makes possible the 
convergence of the moral freedom of all autonomous agents that is 
required for the achievement of either of these definitive forms of 
human moral community. That gesture is an appeal to the hope for 
the convergence of the workings of nature and freedom that he takes 
to be grounded in moral reason, a hope that provides the content of 
his larger critical reconceptualization of the theological doctrine of 
providence. 
An assessment of Kant’s reconstruction of providence is 
important for determining the overall coherence of the account of the 
relation between nature and freedom that is central to his critical 
philosophy.13 Such an assessment does not, however, directly bear 
upon the more immediate purpose of this section, which is to 
articulate the disparity between the exercise of moral autonomy on 
matters of war and peace as a marker of the moral unintelligibility of 
war. As has already been indicated, Kant is quite vigorous in his 
affirmation that acknowledgment of the categorical imperative that 
there shall be no war requires an agent to exercise moral autonomy, 
i.e., to recognize and to act upon it as a maxim for an unconditioned 
duty that has its basis in moral reason and is incumbent on all moral 
agents. This affirmation is re-enforced in Kant’s discussion of the 
difference between the moral politician and the political moralist in 
which, as noted in the citation from “Perpetual Peace” two paragraphs 
above, he focuses precisely upon the duty to end war and to enter into 
an international order for establishing enduring peace as a prime 
instance of the fundamental difference between these two ways of 
exercising political leadership. Kant’s discussion makes it clear that the 
moral politician is the only one who autonomously determines his 
course of action in leading the state; the political moralist, on the 
other hand, determines his course of action in ways that can be 
understood only as instances of heteronomy, i.e., as “subordinating 
principles to the end” (ZeF GS 8: 376/ET 376). 
In contrast to the clarity with which he endorses the autonomy 
by which one is to pursue peace, Kant’s silence is deafening with 
respect to the possibility that maxims by which one might justify 
engaging in war can be adopted autonomously as the dictates of moral 
reason. The possibility that entering into a state of war might be the 
subject for the exercise of moral autonomy does not even come under 
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consideration. This should not be surprising inasmuch as Kant equates 
the state of nature with a paradigmatically lawless condition: it places 
human beings at the farthest remove from the conditions of reciprocity 
and mutual respect for one another that give autonomy its moral 
intelligibility. In this condition the enmity that is war provides the 
default form by which humans engage one another; its ‘form’ is the 
chaos of a moral unintelligibility in which there is no standard to judge 
what is right in our dealings with one another except the successful 
exercise of naked power upon another. It is a condition in which the 
governing maxim for human conduct can only be: ‘there shall be war.’ 
Kant notes this when he observes In fact the political moralist can say 
that regent and people or nation and nation do each other no wrong 
when they attack each other by force or fraud, though they do wrong 
generally in that they deny all respect to the concept of right, which 
alone could found peace in perpetuity. (ZeF GS 8: 380/ET 346)  
It is of no little significance that Kant makes this remark 
precisely from the perspective of the heteronomy of the political 
moralist. In keeping with the sharply ironic tone that permeates 
“Perpetual Peace,” Kant is unsparing in his characterization of political 
moralists as agents whose guiding maxims for action are all 
heteronomous: they “frame morals to suit the statesman’s advantage” 
(ZeF GS 8: 372/ET 340); by “glossing over political principles contrary 
to right” they “make improvement impossible and perpetuate, as far 
as they can, violations of right” and “they deal in machinations” (ZeF 
GS 8: 373/ET 341); they “approach the right of a state and the right 
of nations … in a spirit of chicanery” and make use of “sophistical 
maxims” (ZeF GS 8: 374/ET 341–42). On Kant’s account, the moral 
unintelligibility of war is patently obvious from the heteronomous 
perspective of the politics of power that guides or, perhaps more 
accurately, misguides the political moralist. Might Kant be proposing as 
well that such moral unintelligibility should be at least as patently 
obvious to his readers, especially to those sovereigns who have in 
their hands the power not just to exercise a specious ‘right’ to engage 
in war but also to exercise their moral freedom by heeding the actual 
and ever pressing duty to establish peace? 
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